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What Happens When the 
United States Unambiguously 
Breaches a Treaty?
????????? ?????
!e United States justi"ably prides itself on its devotion to “the rule 
of law.” We take legal instruments seriously; when we assume a binding 
legal obligation at home, we mean it, and we expect all parties to the agree-
ment to demonstrate comparable fealty. 
!is commitment to the law also extends to international agree-
ments. Treaties are the coin of the international realm, and the United 
States leads the world both in making treaties and in publicly and point-
edly holding others accountable when they fall short of full compliance.1 
What happens, then, when the United States contravenes a binding inter-
national legal obligation in a manner so obvious and unarguable that it can 
o#er no defense to the charge of breach?
It happens more often than one might think and to more important 
treaties than one would hope, including treaties for which the United States 
continues to depend upon fastidious performance by other countries. Here, 
I present three illustrative cases studies of blatant U.S. violations of binding 
international legal obligations: the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, 
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and the obligation 
to pay annual dues under the Charter of the United Nations. I explain the 
causes of these breaches and examine their adverse consequences for the 
United States and for the international rule of law.
David A. Koplow is Professor of Law and Direc tor of the Center for Applied Legal Studies 
at Georgetown University Law Center. He was Special Counsel for Arms Control to the 
General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, from 2009 to 2011.
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TWO STREAMS OF LAW
First, however, a bit of background about the two independent and 
somewhat-competing streams of legal authority governing treaties. On the 
one hand, under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, a treaty, as a matter of 
domestic law, is the “supreme Law of the Land.” Only the Constitution is 
superior to a treaty and the latter has the equivalent legal dignity of a statute. 
Article II of the Constitution further states that the President of the United 
States has the obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 
Juxtaposing these texts, it is “black letter law” that a treaty must be enforced 
unless it runs afoul of a provision of the Constitution (noting that a treaty may 
be invalidated as “unconstitutional” in the same sense as a statute) or if it is 
superseded by a directly contrary stipulation in a subsequently enacted statute.
On the other hand, international law presents a somewhat di#erent 
hierarchy of legal rules. From the perspective of international jurispru-
dence, the foundational prescription is pacta sunt servanda; treaties are to 
be respected and international obligations must be obeyed. Treaties and 
other forms of international law, therefore, occupy the apex of the legal 
pyramid and all domestic authorities of any particular country—whether 
denominated as rules of its national constitution, ordinary legislation, 
or in any other manner—are subsidiary. A country may not, under this 
system, interpose domestic law as a justi"cation for its failure to meet treaty 
requirements. If it could, there would not be much point in concluding 
such agreements.
!e President of the United States may therefore occasionally be 
handcu#ed by this amalgamation of distinct legal authorities. If a valid 
treaty imposes an obligation, international law will demand adherence to 
it. However, if the same treaty violates the Constitution or if a subsequent 
domestic statute were to contain a contradictory obligation, the President’s 
ability to ful"ll international obligations would be constrained. !e United 
States must then adhere to domestic law and violate the treaty, or develop a 
creative mechanism to reconcile the contradictory requirements of the treaty 
and the statute. U.S. institutions have demonstrated great zeal in attempting 
to "nd or invent such harmonization, but it is not always possible. 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
In practice, violations of international law are not usually formally 
adjudicated. !e world’s leading international judicial tribunal, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), typically resolves only two or three 
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cases per year, and it does not possess automatic jurisdictional power over 
the United States, Russia, China, and other leading international actors 
who have not submitted themselves to the Court’s mandatory authority. 
Some other international courts, such as the European Court of Justice, are 
more active, but even the most successful do not exercise the same primacy 
in the global arena that U.S. courts enjoy domestically. Aside from judi-
cial institutions, the United Nations Security Council holds the power to 
resolve disputes in a compulsory fashion. However, the veto power ensures 
that the "ve permanent members—and their allies—are protected against 
any adverse "ndings or orders. !e “court of world public opinion” can be 
meaningful too, but its judgments are often murky.
Debates about putative treaty violations are also often inconclusive 
because international law, like domestic U.S. law, is frequently contest-
able. For example, the rules for demarcating a disputed land or maritime 
boundary or the interpretation of a World Trade Organization obligation 
about improper barriers to international trade can be obscure, ambiguous, 
and debatable. Often, the United States (or any other country) adopts a 
certain interpretation of the treaty. If the issue becomes a cause célèbre, the 
United States might “win” or “lose” the debate over its interpretation. But 
if the matter is truly one on which countries could reasonably disagree, 
there may not be much embarrassment for a country that has in good faith 
advanced what subsequently turns out to be only a minority position.
We should not overstate this ambivalence—there are plenty of 
instances in which the United States publicly adopted a legal posture 
wholly at odds with the mainstream opinion of the world legal commu-
nity. !e recent U.S. arguments that 
waterboarding was not “torture,” for 
example, or that “extraordinary rendi-
tion” was legally permissible, failed the 
international laugh test. In the 1999 
NATO bombing campaign against 
Serbia to arrest the ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovo, the United States did not have 
a real legal justi"cation to propound, 
since it was acting without authoriza-
tion from the Security Council and 
without a self-defense rationale. But the 
point is that in most of those instances, the United States at least had some-
thing to say. It may have only been a half-baked legal theory, a justi"cation 
that rested on impressionistic “legitimacy” rather than strict “lawfulness,” 
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or a nuanced rationale that inspired precious little international resonance. 
But at least U.S. representatives had a story to o#er by way of defense, 
explanation, or mitigation.
At other times, however, the U.S. position garners absolutely no legal 
support—and deserves none. On multiple occasions, the United States has 
joined a valid treaty, helped bring it into legal force, accepted the obliga-
tions and the bene"ts that come with it, and then unarguably and ostenta-
tiously violated the treaty. As detailed in the three cases below, the United 
States has a history of $atly breaching commitments and, when challenged, 
having nothing to assert in its defense. 
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
!e 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) constitutes a 
comprehensive and nearly universal bulwark against chemical warfare. Its 
ambitious scope is re$ected in the preamble, in which the parties declare 
themselves “determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely 
the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.” !e treaty has attracted 
188 parties and the detail and speci"city of its terms represent “state of the 
art” arms control veri"cation methodology. By any measure, it is one of the 
most signi"cant and successful disarmament agreements in history.
Parties to the CWC commit to never develop, produce, acquire, 
retain, transfer, or use chemical weapons and to destroy their existing 
stockpiles. !e treaty lays out a timetable for the elimination of existing 
weapons—called the “order of destruction”—with interim benchmarks 
until the tenth year. By then, each party must have incinerated, chemically 
neutralized, or otherwise destroyed 100 percent of its declared chemical 
weapon inventory. If a party experiences di%culty meeting these deadlines, 
it can apply for an extension, but the treaty stipulates that “in no case” 
may the "nal deadline for completing the entirety of the chemical weapon 
elimination exceed a total of "fteen years.
Unsurprisingly, the United States and Russia declared the over-
whelming majority of the world’s chemical weapon stocks, with approxi-
mately 30,000 tons and 40,000 tons respectively. Five other countries 
(Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, and South Korea) had, or still have, much 
smaller chemical weapon reserves to wrestle with. !e two chemical levia-
thans devoted time, technology, and treasure to the chore of destroying 
the chemical reservoirs that each had so assiduously assembled during the 
Cold War. For the United States, the destruction process has consumed an 
estimated $28 billion to date.
57
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!e CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997 and made April 29, 
2012 the "nal deadline for completing the chemical weapon destruction 
operations, even with the single allowable "ve-year extension. Neither the 
United States nor Russia met that deadline. !e U.S. Army, responsible 
for leading the American chemical weapon destruction program, accom-
plished approximately ninety percent of the goal by the speci"ed dead-
line, but noted that it will take until the fourth quarter of 2023—some 
eleven and a half years beyond the supposedly “"nal” date—to eliminate 
the remainder. Moscow managed to destroy only about sixty percent of 
its inventory by the target date. Yet, despite its initial inertia, Russia is 
now moving considerably faster and projects to complete the remainder of 
its chemical weapon destruction operations by about 2015. Some experts, 
however, are skeptical of Russia’s ability to meet that target and would add 
two or three more years to the prediction. 
It must be acknowledged that the job of destroying this amount of 
chemical detritus is a severe challenge. !e munitions are old, fragile, and 
diverse, and they occasionally leak; the chemicals are extremely hazardous 
and sometimes congealed into rubbery “heels” of hard-to-destroy residue. 
!e inventory was not constructed with the possibility of safe destruction 
in mind and operators have had to innovate suitable procedures, equip-
ment, and facilities. 
!e CWC allows each party to determine for itself which destruction 
technology to use, with the exceptions of forbidding open-pit burning, 
land burial, and dumping into a body of water. !e treaty also appropri-
ately stipulates that in chemical weapon destruction operations, each party 
“shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to 
protecting the environment.” Still, the timetable in the “order of destruc-
tion” must be met.
!ree fateful factors contributed to the U.S. failure to meet the 
treaty’s deadline. First, mismanagement, poor oversight, and mangled 
lines of bureaucratic supervision led to much of the delay. Many govern-
ment programs su#er notorious cost overruns and schedule delays, but the 
record of the chemical demilitarization campaign is even worse than most. 
!e Government Accountability O%ce has issued dozens of reports criti-
cizing various aspects of the administrative operations; the Department 
of Defense has largely concurred in the analyses and pledged, though not 
always successfully, to do better.2
Second, because the chemical weapon stocks were stored at eight 
disparate locations around the continental United States, the Army 
had initially contemplated relocating much of the ordnance into a few 
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centralized repositories to allow for more e%cient, larger-scale operations. 
However, in response to constituent opposition to such transport, Congress 
forbade the interstate shipment of these fragile and dangerous parapher-
nalia, requiring investment in multiple, arguably redundant facilities.3 
!ird, domestic politics led to the introduction of new technolo-
gies for destroying the chemical weapons, causing further delay. A series 
of technical studies by the National Academies of Sciences validated the 
safety and e#ectiveness of incineration as the preferred methodology for 
eliminating most of the U.S. chemical weapon stocks. Accordingly, the 
Army adopted plans to construct a series of state-of-the-art furnaces and 
other facilities at the storage locations, which eventually succeeded in 
destroying ninety percent of the inventory within the treaty’s timetable. 
However, some local communities resisted, horri"ed by the prospect that 
smokestacks might spew even minute quantities of such lethal substances 
into the environment. Again, Congress responded, mandating the use of 
“alternative technologies” such as chemical neutralization and additional 
processing at two sites—Lexington, Kentucky and Pueblo, Colorado—
that together held about ten percent of total U.S. chemical weapons.4 
Unfortunately, the process of designing, developing, constructing, testing, 
and obtaining federal and state environmental and safety permits for these 
alternative technology facilities has consumed an inordinate amount of 
time. Construction is now proceeding apace at both locations, but the 
current timetable has Pueblo begin-
ning its chemical weapon destruction 
operations in 2015 and "nishing in 
2019. Lexington, which holds only 1.7 
percent of the original stocks, will start 
destruction operations in 2020 and 
"nish in 2023.
!e point is that the United 
States is currently violating a central 
provision of a major arms control 
treaty, and it has no one but itself to 
blame. None of the usual legal excuses that are sometimes available to miti-
gate a delict of an international agreement—doctrines such as “impossi-
bility” or “changed circumstances”—are applicable here. !e United States 
has neither contested its prima facie failure to meet the CWC deadline nor 
advanced any defense against the legal conclusion.
In sharp contrast, the United States regularly monitors other coun-
tries’ performance regarding their obligations under the CWC. It has vigor-
!e point is that the United 
States is currently violating a 
central provision of a major 
arms control treaty, and 




ously pressed those who have fallen short even on secondary matters, which 
include the failure by some parties to designate a “National Authority” as a 
central point of contact for CWC matters or the absence in some states of 
domestic legislation to ensure that private parties honor treaty provisions. 
But in this instance—notably a much more important failure to comply 
with one of the treaty’s central obligations—the United States is unwilling 
even to concede that the vocabulary of “breach” or “non-compliance” is 
applicable. American diplomats have restricted the analysis to a neutral 
comment, noting that the United States has simply been “unable to meet 
the deadline.”5
!e United States and Russia are behaving “in good faith” in 
pursuing chemical weapon destruction—albeit at a dilatory pace—and do 
not retain any viable military advantage from their prolonged possession 
of these largely obsolete and dysfunctional munitions. !ere is no doubt 
that the two countries will eventually achieve the CWC’s desired end state: 
complete eradication of the toxic threats. Likewise, neither country has 
retreated from the demand that all other parties must remain equally reso-
lute in their rejection of chemical weapon use. But, for at least the next 
eleven years, the United States will stand in stark, unexcused violation of 
this central international legal obligation.
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
!e 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is 
the leading international instrument on the status, rights, protections, and 
responsibilities of consular o%cials inside a receiving state.6 One hundred 
and seventy-three parties have joined the treaty and it is widely regarded as 
one of the foundation stones of normal international relations.
Article 36 of the VCCR stipulates that when a party arrests, imprisons, 
or detains a foreign citizen, it must inform him “without delay” of his 
right to have his consul noti"ed of the adverse action and to communicate 
with his home authorities. !e consul’s o%ce will then be in a position to 
visit the detainee, monitor the situation, and o#er whatever assistance or 
support it deems appropriate. !is protection may or may not be of great 
practical value to the detainee; there is no guarantee that the consul will 
provide legal advice, investigatory assistance, or diplomatic pressure for 
release. But some states, such as Mexico, regularly extend these important 
services to their nationals in times of need. !e fundamental notion is that 
the sending state should have an opportunity to look after its people and 
the treaty-required noti"cation of arrest is where this supervision begins.
INDISPUTABLE VIOLATIONS: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN 
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!e United States exercises its VCCR rights on a daily basis inside 
foreign countries and relies upon the other treaty parties to advise American 
arrestees of their right to contact U.S. o%cial personnel. In 2010, American 
consular o%cers conducted 9,500 prison visits and assisted 3,500 U.S. citi-
zens arrested abroad. !e formality sometimes carries little value, but in 
potentially abusive and hostile environments American intervention can 
be quite important. For example, the VCCR formed a critical part of the 
U.S. legal action against Iran after the seizure and detention of American 
embassy personnel in Tehran during the hostage crisis of 1979-1981. 
In 2009, two U.S. citizens, Euna Lee and Laura Ling, were arrested 
for illegally crossing from China into North Korea. !ey were held by 
North Korean o%cials for months, interrogated, tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to twelve years of hard labor. !ey experienced what they 
described as weeks of isolation where their only contact with the outside 
world was visits from the Swedish ambassador. Since U.S.-North Korea 
diplomatic relations are suspended, Sweden agreed to assert U.S. rights 
under the VCCR. !ese brief consular visits convinced Lee and Ling that 
outsiders had not forgotten them and, as Lee put it, “[they] protected me 
from any physical mistreatment by my captors.”7 
However, the United States routinely violates the VCCR. When 
U.S. law enforcement authorities arrest or detain foreign nationals, they 
fail, dozens of times annually, to advise them of their rights and to notify 
the appropriate consuls.8 !e indi-
vidual arrestees, often unaware of the 
treaty and its provisions, do not a%r-
matively solicit assistance from their 
consuls; likewise, the consuls, ignorant 
of the fate of their citizen, are unable to 
reach out with any support. Often, the 
alien is tried, convicted, sentenced, and 
incarcerated in a routine fashion before 
anyone notices that the VCCR might 
be relevant. At that point, a perverse 
“Catch-22” situation arises: if the non-
citizen fails to raise a complaint about the VCCR violation at the trial 
level—including if he fails to assert the argument because he was never 
advised of his rights under the treaty—U.S. law determines that his claim 
has been permanently waived. !is “procedural default” rule precludes the 
breach from being remedied, or even considered, in subsequent proceed-
ings or appeals.
When U.S. law enforcement 
authorities arrest or detain 
foreign nationals, they fail, 
dozens of times annually, to 
advise them of their rights 




!e fundamental reason for persistent American non-compliance is 
that most law enforcement activity in the United States is conducted at 
the state and municipal levels, not at the federal level. Local police may 
have little training and even less interest in international legal a#airs. !ey 
may have never heard of the VCCR or may not have a standard routine 
for implementing its requirements. Conversely, Department of State o%-
cials, who are keenly aware of the reciprocity value of adherence to the 
treaty as a lifeline for Americans arrested abroad, have little power to ensure 
adherence to the treaty mandate inside the domestic U.S. system. !e 
Department of State has prepared and promulgated voluminous training 
materials to inform and instruct local law enforcement o%cials about the 
VCCR. It has recently released the third edition of its manual Consular 
Noti"cation and Access,9 distributed over one million sets of brie"ng mate-
rials, and issued 70,000 pocket cards 
for law enforcement o%cials to carry. 
But the Department of State cannot 
ensure that the training is undertaken 
or heeded.
!e violation scenario is therefore 
replayed with distressing frequency year 
after year, with foreigners from many 
countries denied the protection that 
the treaty was intended to ensure. On 
three separate occasions, the ICJ has 
heard complaints against the United 
States on these grounds. !ese are 
open-and-shut violations: Department 
of State lawyers have explicitly conceded the U.S. de"ciency.10 !e only 
persistent di%culty in these cases concerns the remedy—what, if anything, 
can the U.S. executive branch do under the Constitution to correct the 
failures of local law enforcement and preclude their repetition?
!e "rst such case, arising in 1992, involved Angel Breard, a 
Paraguayan citizen charged with attempted rape and capital murder in 
Arlington, Virginia. Breard was not a#orded the requisite VCCR disclo-
sures; the Paraguayan consul was not engaged in a timely manner; and 
Breard was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. While he was on 
death row, Paraguay sued the United States in the ICJ, alleging the viola-
tion of the treaty and demanding some form of fresh judicial process for 
him. While the case was pending, the ICJ sought to freeze the status quo 
in anticipation of an upcoming oral argument, and ordered the United 
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States in the interim to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure that 
Angel Francisco Breard [was] not executed pending the "nal decision in 
these proceedings.”11 
!e United States took the extraordinary step in the ICJ of admit-
ting that the failures of Virginia authorities constituted a U.S. breach of the 
treaty and formally apologized to Paraguay.12 Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright sent a letter to Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore III requesting 
a stay of execution, since “execution of Mr. Breard in the face of the Court’s 
April 9 action could be seen as a denial by the United States of the signi"-
cance of international law and the Court’s processes in its international rela-
tions and thereby limit our ability to ensure that Americans are protected 
when living or traveling abroad.”13
Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that although 
the United States had thwarted its international obligation by failing to 
provide prompt consular noti"cation, under applicable U.S. procedural 
rules Breard had forfeited his VCCR claim by failing to assert it at the 
outset of the criminal prosecution.14 Shortly after that decision, Governor 
Gilmore rejected relief, and Breard was executed by lethal injection.15
A similar drama played out only a few years later, when German 
brothers Karl and Walter LaGrand were arrested in Arizona. Like Breard, 
they were not a#orded the mandatory VCCR disclosures, even after the 
police became aware of their foreign nationality. Both brothers were tried, 
convicted for murder, and sentenced to death. After years of appellate liti-
gation and diplomatic wrangling, Karl LaGrand was executed on February 
24, 1999. Walter LaGrand’s execution was scheduled for a few days later 
and Germany "led an emergency suit against the United States in the ICJ. 
!e ICJ issued a preliminary order against the execution, which the U.S. 
federal government determined it could not enforce by itself, but which 
it communicated to Arizona Governor Jane Dee Hull. Governor Hull 
rejected clemency, and Walter LaGrand was executed.
As in Breard, the U.S. government was forced to concede in oral and 
written ICJ proceedings that it had failed to comply with Article 36 of the 
VCCR. It apologized to Germany and o#ered assurances that it would 
try to avoid repetition. Germany nonetheless asked the ICJ to obtain 
more de"nitive assurances of e#ective implementation of the treaty by the 
United States, and more meaningful responses to any future breaches. !e 
ICJ ruled that the United States would have to develop a mechanism of 
its own choosing for “review and reconsideration” of any conviction and 
sentencing that would be a#ected by another treaty violation.16
In 2003, a third case arose over a group of "fty-one Mexican citi-
63
vol.37:1 winter 2013
zens, each of whom had been processed through the U.S. judicial system 
and sentenced to death without VCCR protections, despite the U.S. assur-
ances about not replicating the violations of Breard and LaGrand. In a case 
denominated Avena, the ICJ again ruled that the United States had clearly 
violated the treaty and ordered that the "fty-one Mexicans were entitled 
to “review and reconsideration.” !e Court noted with concern that “there 
remain a substantial number of cases of failure to carry out the obligation 
to furnish consular information to Mexican nationals,” but it appreciated 
the United States’ “good faith e#orts to implement the obligations incum-
bent upon it.”17
In 2005, President George W. Bush determined that the United 
States would “discharge its international obligations” by having state courts 
“give e#ect to the decision,” and he sent a memorandum to that e#ect to 
the relevant state authorities. In Texas, the test case involved Jose Ernesto 
Medellin, who had been convicted of murder. Texas authorities declined 
to o#er relief, and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the President lacked 
constitutional authority to compel state o%cials to conform. Medellin was 
then executed.
!ese cases are far from simple. !ey raise some of the most compli-
cated points of international and U.S. constitutional law, and of the rela-
tionship between competing authorities at the global, national, and state 
levels. One point, however, remains crystal clear: Article 36 requires the 
United States to provide consular noti"cations, and the United States 
repeatedly fails to do so. Good faith 
attempts at remediation and reform, 
as well as the bromides from both 
Democratic and Republican executive 
branch leaders have persistently proven 
unavailing. 
In 2005, frustrated with the 
inability to ensure compliance and 
embarrassed by repeatedly losing “slam 
dunk” cases in the ICJ, the United 
States withdrew from the “optional 
protocol” to the VCCR.18 !is maneuver does not terminate U.S. partici-
pation in the whole treaty—the United States still sustains the agreement 
as a vital vehicle for protecting U.S. citizens who are incarcerated abroad 
and is still legally obligated to perform reciprocal duties—but it does 
remove the mechanism that allows other parties to bring suit against the 
United States in the ICJ. So the U.S. violations continue, but the avenue 
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for attaining international judicial accountability is foreclosed. By the same 
measure, the United States can no longer protect U.S. nationals abroad by 
bringing its own suits in the ICJ.
In 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the “Consular Noti"cation 
Compliance Act,” designed to facilitate compliance with the VCCR noti-
"cation requirements and the ful"llment of the U.S. commitments under-
taken in the ICJ proceedings. Despite 
strong endorsement by the Obama 
Administration, however, prospects for 
this legislation remain unclear.
!erefore, the current situa-
tion continues to re$ect the persistent 
asymmetry in international practice; 
the United States remains a party to 
the VCCR and derives the antici-
pated bene"ts when a U.S. national is 
arrested abroad, yet repeatedly fails to 
reciprocate. In a 2010 Department of 
State report on U.S. practice in inter-
national law, the government dryly 
asserted, “the United States takes its 
obligations under the VCCR very seriously,” while somehow expressing a 
perverse pride in noting that “the Department receives only about ["fty] 
complaints a year from foreign governments that consular noti"cation has 
not been provided, and many of these complaints are not meritorious.”19
UNITED NATIONS DUES
!e third case study, the recurrent U.S. failure to pay its assessed 
dues to the UN, is in some ways the simplest and most obvious. Here, 
the default is not “accidental” nor is it the unintended byproduct of 
bureaucratic bungling, misbegotten technologies, or ine#ective coordina-
tion among executive, legislative, and state authorities. Instead, the whole 
purpose of the failure to pay has deliberately been to violate U.S. treaty 
obligations, and to do so in an ostentatious, threatening fashion.
!e UN Charter speci"es that “the expenses of the Organization shall 
be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.” On 
most matters, the General Assembly plays only a recommendatory role; 
but on budgetary questions it is a true legislature authorized to specify, via 
a two-thirds vote, the legal obligations of members.20
!e current situation 
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!e overall "nancial structure of the UN de"es easy explanation. !e 
total costs are sometimes divided into separate accounts for the “regular” budget 
(for the primary functions of the institution), the budget for specialized agen-
cies and other members of the UN family, the costs of various international 
peacekeeping operations (now totaling seventeen missions on four continents) 
and other categories. !e money comes both from assessed dues and from 
members’ voluntary contributions—which may seem less reliable than manda-
tory dues, but which account for well over half of the organization’s "nances. 
!e grand total of UN spending now tops $30 billion annually.21
!e UN Committee on Contributions has the primary responsibility 
for recommending the “scale of assessments” to the General Assembly, based 
on each member state’s ability to pay, accounting for factors including per 
capita income, relative share of the world economy, and debt burden. !e 
minimum allocation, paid by thirty-nine countries, is 0.001 percent of 
the regular budget, or about $26,000. !e United States’ assessments are 
currently 22 percent of the regular budget and 27.14 percent of the peace-
keeping budget.22 !is amounts to a total annual contribution of about 
$2.5 billion. As a re$ection of its preponderant role in the world economy, 
the U.S. share of UN dues is by far the largest of any country. It would be 
an even greater percentage if the members had not agreed to arti"cially cap 
a state’s maximum possible dues.
!e problem is that the United States routinely does not cough up 
its assessed dues. Over the years, the United States has repeatedly withheld, 
reduced, or delayed its required annual contribution in protest over a wide 
variety of UN actions. On occasion, the United States has interrupted its 
assigned payments or threatened a “"nancial veto” with respect to speci"c, 
unwelcome UN programs or actions.23 In addition to these “targeted” cuts, 
the United States has sometimes unilaterally in$icted an across-the-board 
withholding of a percentage of its assessed dues as a way of reducing the 
overall U.S. government budget.24
Sometimes, Congress has been the locus of the resistance to meeting 
the U.S. dues commitment. Even if the President wanted to satisfy an 
international legal obligation, under the U.S. system, the Treasury can 
ordinarily make no disbursements without legislative authorization and 
appropriation. If Congress were to decline the funds, the President would 
be unable to sign the checks. Other times, the legislative branch supports 
the UN, but the executive branch withholds payment to make a point or 
exert political pressure.25 Either way, the United States tries, in e#ect, to 
single-handedly convert the overall dues obligation into an à la carte whim, 
funding selected activities but shunning others. 
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Missed payments are not forgiven or forgotten; they accumulate into 
an “arrearage.” Many countries occasionally or routinely pile up such back-
logs; yet, the United States has consistently stacked up the largest and most 
persistent debt to the UN. In 1998, for example, the U.S. arrearage rose 
to a then-record $1.58 billion. It took prolonged negotiation, brokered by 
U.S. Senators Jesse Helms and Joe Biden, to create a watershed compro-
mise, under which the UN agreed to reduce future U.S. annual assess-
ments, and the United States agreed to pay down the past-due accounts.26 
Still, the protagonists had to rely upon private charity, in the form of a 
$34 million gift o#er from businessman and philanthropist Ted Turner, to 
patch the "nances together and close the deal.27
For most of the past decade, the U.S. arrearage has $uctuated between 
one and two billion dollars, creeping higher in recent years. By the end of 
2011, the de"cit stood at $855 million (roughly twenty-seven percent of 
the world’s total arrearages), and by May 2012, it had swollen to about 
$1.25 billion.28 Controversy has occasionally arisen regarding the actual 
size of the de"cit as the United States and the UN disagree over impor-
tant bookkeeping details, such as the proper reimbursement for logistical 
support the United States provides to peacekeeping operations. “Contested 
arrearages” aside, it is clear that the United States consistently fails to pay 
its assigned dues on time and in full.
!e primary enforcement mechanism for the dues obligation, 
pursuant to Article 19 of the Charter, is that a state that falls in arrears 
by two years “shall have no vote in the General Assembly.” !e General 
Assembly may waive that sanction if it "nds that the failure to pay “is due 
to conditions beyond the control of the 
Member,” as is currently the case for six 
impoverished states.29
!e irregularity of "nancial 
contributions from the United States 
and other members has caused severe 
di%culties for e%cient planning and 
consistent operations of the UN. 
Financial stringency, especially in hard 
times, is one thing; unpredictability 
of funding, especially on such a large 
scale, can be disabling. Meanwhile, the 
demands placed upon the UN—including U.S. requirements for programs 
ranging from civil aviation, to food safety, to patent protection—have not 
abated, nor are they compatible with irregular funding.
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contributions from the 
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!is article is not the place to rehearse the legitimacy of various U.S. 
complaints about UN operations, or to assess the sometimes-salutary e#ect of 
selective withholding of dues as a tactic for inducing needed reforms in orga-
nizational behavior. Rather, the point is simply to observe that a very impor-
tant treaty, namely the UN Charter, requires dues, and the United States has 
conspicuously breached that obligation by deliberately failing to pay. 
!is posture is ironic given the United States’ history of pressing other 
states, notably the Soviet Union, over their failure to share equitably the 
institution’s "nancial burdens. During the 1950s and 1960s, the General 
Assembly initiated UN peacekeeping operations in the Congo and in the 
Middle East, which roiled Cold War tensions and global politics. In protest, 
the USSR and France, along with scores of other states, began withholding 
their dues payments and ran up signi"cant arrearages. Crisis loomed in 
1964, when the Soviet backlog approached the two-year point. !e United 
States asserted that when the arrearage reached that level, the suspension of 
the Soviet vote in the General Assembly would be “mandatory and auto-
matic,” and that the Soviet Union would not be eligible for a waiver, since 
non-payment was not “beyond the control” of Moscow.30 !e United States 
prepared and distributed a strong legal brief pleading for strict compliance. 
!e Soviets threatened to leave the UN if deprived of their vote.
!e UN treaded water for months, nervously agreeing to conduct 
the entire 1964-1965 session of the General Assembly without calling any 
record votes. Eventually, the protagonists fashioned a crude compromise 
that created an alternative mechanism for funding critical peacekeeping 
operations, a#orded France and the Soviet Union a face-saving path to 
begin working down their arrearages, and dodged insolvency for the UN.31 
In grudging acceptance of this accommodation, Arthur Goldberg, the 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, announced, “if any Member 
can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective "nancial 
responsibility with respect to certain activities of the organization, the 
United States reserves the same option to make exceptions if, in our view, 
strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so. !ere can be no double 
standard among the members of the organization.”32
Goldberg’s predecessor as U.S. ambassador to the UN, Adlai E. 
Stevenson, had made the point with exquisite clarity: “!e UN is faced with 
a "nancial and constitutional crisis which must be solved if the Organization 
is to continue as an e#ective instrument. !e Charter cannot be ignored. 
Faith cannot be broken. Commitments must be met. Bills must be paid.”33
Unfortunately, international politics soon turned in a di#erent 
direction. By the 1970s, the United States had conspicuously lost the 
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prior “automatic majority” it had enjoyed in the General Assembly and 
meaningful votes began to swing routinely against U.S. positions. As the 
organization resisted Washington’s preferences, enthusiasm for the institu-
tion—and support for fully funding it—waned. Instead of championing 
the UN, the United States became a reluctant funder and a routine debtor.
Sometimes, instead of exerting its "nancial leverage via the dues allo-
cation to extort reforms in UN institutional practices, prompt changes 
in policies, and punish wayward programs, the United States has with-
drawn altogether from selected UN agencies. !e United States left the 
International Labor Organization in 1977, citing anti-U.S. politicization 
within the organization; it later re-joined in 1980. Similarly, the United 
States exited UNESCO in 1984, complaining about the organization’s 
mismanagement and anti-Western bias, and did not return until 2003. 
(In fact, in 2011, the United States halted its $60 million dues payments 
to UNESCO after the organization admitted Palestine as a member, but 
the United States did not withdraw.) While withdrawal is a more severe 
step than the suspension of dues payments, it is at least a lawful maneuver; 
withdrawal terminates the obligation to pay future assessments, as well as 
the opportunity to participate in the 
organization’s decision-making and to 
bene"t from its programming.
!e United States is not only the 
founder, host, leader, and main bene-
factor of the UN, it is also arguably its 
biggest bene"ciary, as global programs 
related to public health, human rights, 
environmental degradation, natural 
disasters, and counter-terrorism get 
shortchanged without U.S. "nancial 
support and leadership. But Uncle Sam 
the Deadbeat has repeatedly failed to pay its aliquot share of the costs. Some 
impoverished states sometimes cannot pay their just debts; the United 
States can pay, but sometimes just decides not to.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPEATED VIOLATIONS
So what? Why does it matter that the United States violates treaties, 
and occasionally does so without a shred of legal cover? Perhaps that is the 
realpolitik privilege of the global hegemon: to be able to sustain hypocrisy, 
Uncle Sam the Deadbeat 
has repeatedly failed to pay 
its aliquot share of the costs. 
Some impoverished states 
sometimes cannot pay their 
just debts; the United States 




asserting that its unique international responsibilities and its “exceptional” 
position in the world enable the United States explicitly to welch on its 
debts, fudge on its obligations, and adopt a “do as we say, not as we do” 
approach with other countries.
However, there is a cost when the world’s strongest state behaves this 
way. One potential danger is that other countries may mimic this disre-
gard for legal commitments and justify their own cavalier attitudes toward 
international law by citing U.S. precedents. Reciprocity and mutuality are 
fundamental tenets of international practice; it is foolhardy to suppose that 
other parties will inde"nitely continue with treaty compliance if they feel 
that the United States is taking advantage of them by unilateral avoidance 
of shared legal obligations.
So far, there has not been signi"cant erosion of the treaties discussed 
in the three examples. !e United States and Russia will fall years short 
of compliance with the CWC destruction obligations, but other parties, 
with the notable exception of Iran, have reacted with aplomb, comfort-
able with the two giants’ unequivocal commitment to eventual compli-
ance. Likewise, the VCCR is not unraveling, even if other states lament 
the asymmetry in consular access to detained foreigners. And while many 
states pay their UN dues late and build up substantial arrearages, that recal-
citrance seems to stem more from penury than from a deliberate choice to 
follow the U.S. lead.
But that persistent $outing undermines the treaties—and by exten-
sion, it jeopardizes the entire fabric of international law. Chronic noncom-
pliance—especially ostentatious, 
unexcused, unjusti"ed noncompli-
ance—also sullies the nation’s repu-
tation and degrades U.S. diplomats’ 
ability to drive other states to better 
conform with their obligations under 
the full array of treaties and other 
international law commitments from 
trade to human rights to the Law of 
the Sea. !e United States depends upon the international legal structure 
more than anyone else: Americans have the biggest interest in promoting a 
stable, robust, reliable system for international exchange. It is shortsighted 
and self-defeating to publicly and unblushingly undercut the system that 
o#ers the United States so many bene"ts. It is especially damaging when, 
following an indisputable violation, the United States acknowledges its 
default, participates in an international dispute resolution procedure, and 
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apologizes—but then continues to violate the treaty. !e CWC imple-
mentation bodies, the International Court of Justice, and even the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council are unable to e#ectively do much 
to sanction or penalize the mighty United States, but it is still terrible for 
U.S. interests to disregard those mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
A unifying theme underlies the three violations described above. 
!ey all rely upon an insidious combination of a constitutional design 
that automatically elevates domestic U.S. law above international law; a 
superpower status that enables the United States to default on treaty obli-
gations without risking immediate meaningful adverse consequences; and 
a domestic legal and political culture that too often disregards international 
a#airs and foreign opinion, with the result that our government’s violations 
attract little popular attention and outrage.
At this point, little can be done to remedy these three speci"c viola-
tions. !e 2012 CWC deadline has passed, and even heroic and expen-
sive remedial e#orts today could not destroy the remaining chemical 
weapons much faster than the current 
enterprise. !e violations of Consular 
Relations obligations are not “inevi-
table,” but the Department of State 
can do little to compel state and local 
law enforcement o%cials to be more 
attentive to a treaty that they have 
no perceived stake in upholding. !e 
United States’ persistent withholding 
of dues to the UN and its constituent 
bodies is a deliberate political choice 
by congressional and executive leaders 
who profess little shame in driving the 
country into violation of its interna-
tional legal commitments. Our perspective in re$ecting upon the three 
indisputable violations, therefore, must be forward-looking.
International law a#ords a state multiple options when confronting 
a proposed treaty that it largely agrees with, but for which it doubts its 
ability to fully comply. !e state may propose key alterations during the 
treaty negotiations or, if the document has already been concluded, it may 
propound amendments. Often, it can join the treaty with “reservations,” 
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which create certain legally allowable unilateral exemptions. Sometimes, 
the wise course is to delay joining the treaty until the state can be certain 
of its ability to comply. If it has already joined, it might take advantage of 
a “withdrawal” clause to exit the accord. But in the interest of international 
credibility of the state and the international mandate, what it should not 
do is to join the treaty unconditionally, accept the full array of legal obliga-
tions, demand that other countries extend to it the promised bene"ts, and 
then undeniably $out its responsibilities.
!e United States has too often embarrassed itself by playing fast-
and-loose with international law and there is plenty of blame to spread 
around. Sometimes Congress has been at fault; sometimes it was the execu-
tive branch in the lead. Sometimes the 
violation is deliberate; at other times it 
is an unintended consequence of other 
policies or failures. But what these 
three unlovely cases have in common 
is insu%cient attention to the obliga-
tion to “faithfully execute” a treaty as 
“supreme law”—and that failure is 
both foolish and illegal.
!is is not an argument that the 
speci"c costs of these particular indis-
putable violations are, or will soon become, unbearable. !e United States 
is so big and powerful—and international law is so underdeveloped and 
$imsy—that in the short-run a superpower can “get away with” these trans-
gressions. But in the long-run, lawless behavior is unsustainable; elevating 
domestic policy preferences above binding international legal obligations is 
profoundly not in the U.S. interest. Even if the feeble enforcement mecha-
nisms of the international community cannot compel the United States to 
honor its commitments, the country itself should work to promote the rule 
of law by its deeds as well as by its rhetoric.
John Jay warned in Federalist Paper No. 64 on March 7, 1788, “that 
a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible 
to "nd a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be 
binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may 
think proper to be bound by it.” President Obama made the same point 
in his celebrated April 5, 2009 speech in Prague: “Rules must be binding. 
Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.” !at is true, 
even for the United States. ?
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